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Abstract 
We investigate whether and how the complexity of derivatives influences analysts’ earnings 
forecast properties. Using a difference-in-differences design, we find that, relative to a matched 
control sample of non-users, analysts’ earnings forecasts for new derivatives users are less accurate 
and more dispersed after derivatives initiation. These results do not appear to be driven by the 
economic complexity of derivatives, but rather the financial reporting of such economic 
complexity. Overall, despite their financial expertise, analysts routinely misjudge the earnings 
implications of firms’ derivatives activity. However, we find evidence that a series of derivatives 
accounting standards has helped analysts improve their forecasts over time. 
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Do analysts understand the economic and reporting complexities of derivatives? 
1. Introduction 
Many corporations use derivatives to hedge financial risks that threaten revenues, costs of 
goods sold, and various expenses, as well as to speculate in the capital and commodities markets. 
However, as one of the most economically complex types of financial contracts, derivatives create 
significant financial reporting challenges. Experts claim that many companies using derivatives do 
not apply the related accounting rules correctly or consistently, making it “next to impossible” for 
stakeholders to assess a firm’s derivatives activity from its financial reports (Kawaller 2004, 29). 
Although sell-side analysts have long been viewed as financial experts who are less likely (than 
naïve investors) to misinterpret complex information (Ramnath et al. 2008), it is unclear if analysts 
understand the “exceedingly complex” nature of derivatives (Ryan 2007, 269). We fill this void in 
the literature by examining whether and how the complexity of derivatives influences the accuracy 
and dispersion of earnings forecasts issued by sell-side analysts. 
The properties of analysts’ earnings forecasts are influenced by factors such as analysts’ 
ability to obtain and process information, opportunities to signal talent, and economic incentives 
(Ramnath et al. 2008). The complexity of transactions and financial information resulting from a 
firm’s use of derivatives can affect each of these factors and, thus, the properties of analysts’ 
earnings forecasts. Moreover, derivatives contracts, the markets in which they trade, and requisite 
financial reporting are notoriously complex. The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) 
has issued a series of standards to help simplify derivatives accounting, but some of these efforts 
are criticized as the “poster child of complexity” (Leone 2007) and a “labyrinth of processes and 
documentation” (Valladares 2014). Prior research examines the effects of specific reporting 
complexities, such as those pertaining to intangibles (Barth et al. 2001) and taxes (Plumlee 2003), 
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on analysts’ decisions. But, there is limited evidence as to whether and how the economic and 
reporting complexities of derivatives, an increasingly popular form of risk management, influence 
analysts’ earnings forecasts. These are important open questions given the interplay between 
accounting and the information analysts provide to capital markets (Beyer et al. 2010).  
Within the reporting-user context, complexity refers to the difficulty that a user may have 
in understanding the mapping of economic transactions and reporting standards into financial 
statements (Peterson 2012). Although derivatives allow firms to manage risks in the presence of 
uncertainty, such contracts are well-known for their complexity. From an economic standpoint, 
derivatives are complex because their value can be linked to virtually any underlying asset or 
liability, including other derivatives, to fulfill numerous financial objectives (Koonce et al. 2005). 
By virtue of this economic complexity, financial reporting for derivatives is also remarkably 
complex. Firms use considerable judgment to apply elaborate reporting standards to intricate 
transactions that often have widely varying fact patterns (Ryan 2007). However, the economic and 
reporting complexities of derivatives are interrelated as reporting standards are developed with the 
intent of capturing the underlying economics of transactions (Peterson 2012). 
We first examine whether and how the economic and reporting complexities of derivatives 
jointly influence the accuracy and dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecasts. From an accuracy 
standpoint, complex information about derivatives in firms’ financial reports could hinder 
analysts’ ability to accurately forecast earnings (Kawaller 2004).1 However, by shielding earnings 
from unfavorable and unexpected changes in risk factors (e.g., interest rates), derivatives could 
                                                            
1 For example, in its 2003 annual report, Microsoft Corporation states that it hedges “a portion” of its “foreign 
currency, interest rate, and fixed income and equity price risks” (Item 7A, 18). However, Kawaller (2004) notes that 
the company provides no clear quantitative parameters to discern if a majority or only a small part of these risks are 
hedged, or what factors would cause alterations to hedged amounts. Informative disclosures about hedge losses and 
even larger gains associated with risk exposures are helpful for assessing both hedge and firm performance.  
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enable more accurate earnings predictions. For dispersion, the difficulty of obtaining and analyzing 
derivatives information could increase analysts’ propensity to mimic other analysts (i.e., herd), 
resulting in less dispersed earnings forecasts (Welch 2000; Clement and Tse 2005). If, however, 
analysts rely on their own expertise to forecast earnings for derivatives users (perhaps to signal 
their talent), greater dispersion is expected (Hong et al. 2000; Clarke and Subramanian 2006).  
Using the focused setting of new derivatives users, a difference-in-differences design, and 
conventional measures of earnings forecast properties (Beyer et al. 2010), we find less accurate 
and more dispersed forecasts for firms that begin using derivatives during 1998-2011. In particular, 
earnings forecasts for new derivatives users are 26% less accurate and 27% more dispersed after 
derivatives initiation. These estimates are similar to those for other extensive changes in firms’ 
financial reporting practices (Tan et al. 2011). Together, these results suggest the economic and 
reporting complexities of derivatives jointly hinder the accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts 
and lead analysts to rely more on their own expertise rather than mimic other analysts.  
We next evaluate whether the decrease (increase) in earnings forecast accuracy (dispersion) 
for new derivatives users is due to economic complexity, reporting complexity, or both. Because 
it is challenging to distinguish between these two types of complexity, we perform several tests of 
whether the accuracy and dispersion of analysts’ forecasts differ when aspects of derivatives 
initiation are more or less linked to each type of complexity. Specifically, we partition the sample 
of new derivatives users based on whether these firms exhibit high or low economic and/or 
reporting complexity with respect to derivatives at the time of initiation. We define high economic 
complexity as using at least two types of derivatives or significantly hedging at least two risk 
exposures; low otherwise. We define high reporting complexity as initiating derivatives during a 
financial reporting regime with relatively limited and ambiguous guidance from standard-setters 
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(2000-2003); low otherwise.2 We find that the negative (positive) relation between derivatives 
initiation and forecast accuracy (dispersion) strengthens as reporting complexity varies from low 
to high, while variation in economic complexity has no effect on this relation. These results suggest 
it is not the use of more than one type of derivative or the hedging of multiple risk exposures 
(economic complexity) that hinders analysts’ assessment of derivatives users, but rather the 
reporting of such economic complexity. 
As another test of whether reporting complexity indeed influences analysts’ forecast 
properties, we perform a structural break analysis on the broader setting of derivatives users (rather 
than new users).3 We find that both earnings forecast accuracy and dispersion for derivatives users 
deteriorate after the enactment of elaborate fair value-based accounting practices under SFAS No. 
133 (FASB 1998), but improve once subsequent standards amend and clarify the accounting for 
derivatives. Although we cannot infer causality from these tests, they validate our main findings 
by showing an association between trends in earnings forecast properties and periods in which the 
FASB was modifying the derivatives reporting environment. Finally, we mitigate alternative 
explanations by documenting that the main results are not driven by (1) ineffective management 
of risk; (2) analysts’ estimates of “Street” earnings; or (3) firm complexity and size. Overall, our 
findings suggest that, despite their financial expertise, sell-side analysts routinely misjudge the 
earnings implications of firms’ derivatives activity. However, a series of derivatives accounting 
standards appears to have helped analysts improve their forecasts over time. 
                                                            
2 The high economic complexity group is based on the idea that uncertainty related to the mapping of transactions into 
financial reports increases with the number of instruments and/or objectives for using derivatives (Peterson 2012). 
The period 2000-2003 coincides with the effective date of accounting standards requiring that all derivatives be 
reported as either assets or liabilities on the balance sheet at fair value with unrealized gains/losses due to changes in 
fair value reported on the income statement (FASB 1998; 2000). Although enacted in response to concerns from 
practice, these standards were heavily criticized for their ambiguity, complexity, and daunting length. Numerous 
standards issued after 2003 clarify the accounting for derivatives. We discuss these issues in Sections 2.2 and 6.4.  
3 Structural break analysis is the panel data equivalent of interrupted time-series. See Section 6.5 for details.  
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This study contributes to growing literatures on analysts (Ramnath et al. 2008; Beyer et al. 
2010) and derivatives (Aretz and Bartram 2010). Anecdotes and research suggest that practitioners 
(Holland and Glasgall 1994) and investors (Koonce et al. 2005) struggle to understand the risks 
and rewards of even basic derivatives. We contribute by showing that, despite their financial 
expertise, analysts misjudge the earnings implications of derivatives. We also extend research on 
derivatives accounting (Melumad et al. 1999; Wong 2000; Sapra 2002; Zhang 2009; Panaretou et 
al. 2013) by separating the complexity of derivatives into its economic and reporting components 
within a dynamic regulatory setting. As such, our study evaluates the usefulness of derivatives 
accounting standards from the perspective of important market participants: financial analysts. 
Finally, our study answers the call for research on the interplay between financial reporting and 
information provided by analysts (Beyer et al. 2010), complements studies suggesting that firms’ 
disclosure practices influence analyst behavior (Botosan and Harris 2000; Mohanram and Sunder 
2006), and offers insight into how the institutional and regulatory setting of derivatives interacts 
with sophisticated market participants (Ramnath et al. 2008).  
Section 2 provides a brief background, and Section 3 develops our hypotheses. Sample 
selection and research design are described in Sections 4 and 5, respectively. Section 6 reports the 
main results, Section 7 discusses additional analyses, and Section 8 concludes.   
2. Background and related literature 
2.1 Analysts’ earnings forecast properties 
As financial experts and information intermediaries, sell-side analysts generate earnings 
forecasts (and other reports) that help investors allocate resources. However, the properties of their 
earnings forecasts are influenced by many factors (see Ramnath et al. (2008) for a review). For 
example, forecast accuracy declines with firm-level factors such as performance variability (Lang 
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and Lundholm 1996) and corporate restructurings (Haw et al. 1994), and analyst-level factors, 
such as the coverage of more firms and industries (Clement 1999). Accuracy improves, however, 
with more informative firm disclosures, analyst brokerage size, and analyst effort and experience 
(Mikhail et al. 1997; Clement 1999; Jacob et al. 1999). By extension, these (and other) factors 
influence forecast dispersion, which reflects the difference of opinion among individual analysts 
as well as the aggregate uncertainty they have about firm fundamentals (Barron et al. 1999; Bowen 
et al. 2002). We contribute to this literature by investigating whether and how the complexity of 
derivatives influences the accuracy and dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecasts. 
2.2 Derivatives accounting and reporting 
 Firms routinely engage in risk management practices to insulate cash flow and earnings 
from unfavorable changes in risk exposures, including interest rates, foreign exchange rates, and 
commodity prices (Aretz and Bartram 2010). Although there are many techniques for managing 
risk, corporate use of derivatives for this purpose is increasingly common (Bartram et al. 2009). A 
derivative is a contract or security deriving its value based on its relation to something else, 
commonly referred to as the “underlying” (Stulz 2004). The underlying is often another financial 
instrument or economic good, but can be almost anything.4 Derivatives are an integral part of the 
global economy, with estimates of notional market size exceeding $710 trillion and derivatives 
usage by nearly two-thirds of U.S. non-financial firms (Bank for International Settlements 2013).  
As noted by Donohoe (2015a), prior to 2000, accounting for derivatives was determined 
by a firm’s purpose for using them. Derivatives held for trading purposes were recorded at fair 
value on the balance sheet with unrealized gains/losses reported on the income statement, while 
                                                            
4 Derivatives generally fall into three categories: (1) options; (2) futures and forwards; and (3) swaps. Options involve 
the right, but not the obligation, to buy or sell the underlying at a set price within a specified period. A futures or 
forward contract involves an obligation to exchange the underlying at a future date for a specific price, and swaps are 
agreements to exchange a stream of payments based on some underlying over a predefined period. 
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derivatives held for hedging purposes were recognized in the same manner as the hedged assets/ 
liabilities. Because most firms used derivatives to hedge risks and recognized assets/liabilities at 
historical cost, most derivatives were recognized at historical cost. However, the recognized 
amounts were frequently small (e.g., option premiums) because derivatives primarily involve only 
a promise of exchange and little to no transfer of tangible consideration (FASB 1998). As a result, 
concerns mounted over whether historical cost fully captured a firm’s risk profile (Zhang 2009).   
In response, the FASB issued SFAS Nos. 133 (FASB 1998) and 138 (FASB 2000), both 
effective in 2000. These standards require that all derivatives be reported as assets or liabilities on 
the balance sheet at fair value with unrealized gains/losses due to changes in fair value reported on 
the income statement. Under certain conditions, the standards permit hedge accounting whereby a 
derivative can hedge exposures to (1) changes in the fair value of a recognized asset/liability or a 
firm commitment; (2) variability in cash flows of a recognized asset/liability or forecasted 
transaction; or (3) currency risk related to foreign activities. For fair value hedges, changes in the 
fair value of both an effective hedge instrument and underlying hedged item are included in net 
income together (i.e., offset). For cash flow hedges, ineffective hedges are included in income, 
while effective hedges are recorded in “Other Comprehensive Income” and later reclassified as 
income when the forecasted cash flow affects earnings. Unrealized gains/losses that result from 
transactions not qualifying for hedge accounting or that result from hedge ineffectiveness are 
recorded in net income as they occur (i.e., no offset).5 Complexity aside, effective hedging can 
mitigate earnings and cash flow volatility (Zhang 2009), potentially reducing a firm’s borrowing 
costs (Beatty and Weber 2003), risk (Graham et al. 2005), and tax liability (Smith and Stulz 1985). 
 Upon issuance, neither standard was explicit about (1) the conditions under which routine 
                                                            
5 A hedge is effective if changes in the fair value (cash flow) of the hedge are between 80 and 125 percent of changes 
in fair value (cash flow) of the underlying (FASB 1998).  
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contracts were, in fact, derivatives, or (2) whether different, yet comparable contracts should be 
accounted for in the same manner (Ryan 2012). Consequently, SFAS Nos. 149 (FASB 2003) and 
155 (FASB 2006) repair these issues by amending SFAS No. 133. Moreover, while SFAS No. 133 
required a firm to discuss its hedging strategy in its financial reports, in practice, the quality of 
such disclosures were diverse (Ryan 2007). As a result, the FASB issued SFAS No. 161 (FASB 
2008) to enhance transparency by requiring a firm to explain: (1) its level of derivatives activity; 
(2) the location and fair value amounts of derivatives, hedged items, and related gains/losses in the 
financial statements; and (3) how derivatives affect financial position, operations, and cash flows. 
Qualitative disclosures about the objectives for using derivatives are also encouraged. Within this 
regulatory context, we investigate whether these derivatives accounting standards are useful to an 
important intermediary in capital markets: the financial analyst.6 
3. Hypothesis development 
The Advisory Committee on Improvements to Financial Reporting (ACIFR) defines 
complexity as “the state of being difficult to understand and apply” (U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission [SEC] 2008). In our context, complexity pertains to the difficulty in understanding 
the mapping of economic transactions and reporting standards into financial statements (Peterson 
2012). Along these lines, prior research finds that the complexity of mergers (Haw et al. 1994), 
intangibles (Barth et al. 2001), international diversification (Duru and Reeb 2002), and corporate 
taxes (Plumlee 2003) influence the forecasting decisions of analysts.   
Derivatives are famous for both economic and reporting complexity. From an economic 
standpoint, derivatives are complex because their value can be linked to virtually any underlying 
asset/liability, including other derivatives, to fulfill a variety of financial objectives (Stulz 2004). 
                                                            
6 These reporting standards are now codified as ASC 815. See Appendix A and Ryan (2007, 2012) for further details.  
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Even mundane derivatives involve intricate contracts with ambiguous and evolving terminology 
(Koonce et al. 2005). By virtue of such economic complexity, financial reporting for derivatives 
is also remarkably complex. Firms exercise considerable judgment to apply elaborate accounting 
standards to sophisticated transactions that often have widely varying fact patterns (Ryan 2012). 
These two types of complexity are undoubtedly interrelated as accounting standards are developed 
with specific economic factors in mind (Peterson 2012). Consequently, many firms inaccurately 
and/or inconsistently account for derivatives in their financial reports, complicating an assessment 
of these firms (Kawaller 2004). However, because analysts possess financial expertise, we evaluate 
whether and how the complexity of derivatives influences their earnings forecast properties.7  
3.1 Earnings forecast accuracy 
According to experts (Kawaller 2004; Ryan 2007), analysts must consider six important 
issues to accurately forecast the earnings of derivatives users: (1) what risk exposures exist, their 
magnitude, and how they vary over time; (2) what amounts of risk exposures are covered; (3) how 
hedges of risk exposures are managed; (4) whether hedge ineffectiveness is temporary or due to 
structural deviations; (5) a firm’s ability to anticipate changes in risk exposures and adjust hedges 
accordingly; and (6) the knowledge and experience of a firm’s risk managers. Unfortunately, a 
static view of derivatives positions (balance sheet) and hedge results over a limited time frame 
(income statement) rarely provides the details necessary to assess these six issues because 
derivatives are reported in vastly different ways among the population of users (Ryan 2007).8 Thus, 
a firm’s use of derivatives could result in less accurate analysts’ earnings forecasts.  
                                                            
7 We attempt to disentangle the effects of economic and reporting complexities in Section 6.4.  
8 For example, although hedge accounting matches the value effects of hedge instruments with those of the underlying 
hedged asset/liabilities to the same period, not all firms qualify and/or choose to practice this accounting method. Even 
when hedge accounting is practiced, firms rarely disclose the unhedged portion of risk exposures, which for valuation 
purposes is likely more relevant than knowing how much a derivative gained or lost (Kawaller 2004). Thus, it is 
challenging for analysts to discern the risks, rewards, and earnings implications of derivatives, whether by brute force 
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 Alternatively, a firm’s use of derivatives could result in more accurate earnings forecasts. 
By shielding earnings from unfavorable changes in risk exposures, derivatives can help isolate 
firm performance. Derivatives can also improve the predictability of firm performance by reducing 
both earnings and cash flow volatility (Zhang 2009). Consistent with derivatives reducing the noise 
in earnings, DaDalt et al. (2002) find that analysts made more accurate earnings forecasts for 
derivatives users (relative to non-users) during 1992–1996. The generalizability of their findings 
to more recent periods is unclear, however. Derivatives contracts and the markets in which they 
trade have become exceedingly complex since their study (Ryan 2012). Also, extensive changes 
in derivatives reporting, such as detailed disclosures (FASB 1994) and the introduction of hedge 
accounting (FASB 1998), have greatly altered the derivatives information environment. Because 
SFAS No. 133 alone has been trumpeted as “increasing the understandability of complex financial 
instruments” (Consumer Federation of America 1997) and also criticized as the “poster child of 
complexity” (Leone 2007), whether derivatives influence analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy is 
an empirical question. Accordingly, we test the following non-directional hypothesis:   
H1: The accuracy of analyst earnings forecasts does not change after a firm initiates derivatives.  
 
3.2 Earnings forecast dispersion 
For dispersion, the central issue is whether the complexity of derivatives increases analysts’ 
propensity to herd (i.e., mimic other analysts). Trueman (1994) analytically shows that low-ability 
analysts issue earnings forecasts that are similar to those of high-ability analysts in order to obtain 
higher compensation. Similarly, archival research finds that analysts herd toward the consensus 
forecast in the presence of complex or incomplete information (Welch 2000; Clement and Tse 
2005). Thus, if analysts manage the complexity of derivatives by herding, their earnings forecasts 
                                                            
or benchmarking across firms. Further, earnings forecasts are directly influenced by analysts’ subjective beliefs about 
future changes in risk exposures (e.g., interest rates), which may or may not ultimately be correct.  
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for derivatives users will be less dispersed. If analysts instead rely on their individual expertise in 
this situation, their forecasts will be more dispersed. In support of the former, DaDalt et al. (2002) 
find a negative relation between dispersion and derivatives usage during 1992–1996. However, as 
noted above, derivatives and the related reporting environment have changed substantially since 
1992. Thus, analysts could either herd to manage the complexity of derivatives, or attempt to signal 
their talent by relying on their expertise to make bold earnings forecasts (Hong et al. 2000; Clarke 
and Subramanian 2006). Accordingly, we test the following non-directional hypothesis:   
H2: The dispersion of analyst earnings forecasts does not change after a firm initiates derivatives.  
 
4. Data and sample selection 
 We begin with Compustat observations for fiscal-years 1998–2011 meeting four criteria: 
(1) publicly traded; (2) domestically incorporated; (3) non-financial, non-utility industry; and (4) 
at least three years of consecutive data.9 We identify new derivatives users by searching Form 10-
Ks (extracted from the SEC’s EDGAR database) for keywords relating to derivatives. Consistent 
with Guay (1999) and Donohoe (2015b), a firm is a New User if it does not report a derivatives 
position when it first appears in the sample, but does report a position in a subsequent year. Firms 
enter the New User sample only when derivatives usage is first observed (after first observing no 
usage). The resulting sample consists of 1,260 New Users during the sample window.  
 We also identify samples of derivatives users and non-users. A firm is a User if it reports 
derivatives in year t and is not a new user, while firms reporting no derivatives are classified as 
Non-Users. A New User firm can be a Non-User in an earlier period if it did not use derivatives 
for at least two consecutive years, and enters the User sample after using derivatives for at least 
                                                            
9 Fiscal year 1998 is the first full financial reporting year after the phase-in of the EDGAR system. Financial (utility) 
firms have two-digit SIC codes 60-69 (49). We remove these firms as they are more likely to use derivatives primarily 
for trading purposes or act as a derivatives dealer, both of which involve different financial reporting requirements.  
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two consecutive years.10 These samples consist of 17,987 Non-User and 15,584 User observations. 
We then drop observations without necessary Compustat, I/B/E/S, and CRSP data to perform the 
analyses that follow, resulting in 10,792 Non-User, 12,000 User, and 561 New User observations.  
<INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE> 
 Table 1 reports characteristics of Non-Users, Users, and New Users. Panel A illustrates the 
temporal distribution of each sample by derivatives reporting regime (Section 2.2). Although the 
number of Non-Users is fairly stable, an increase in Users and New Users coincides with the 
enactment of SFAS Nos. 133/138 (2,558 Users; 217 New Users) and 149 (3,442 Users; 117 New 
Users), which greatly altered derivatives accounting. Similarly, an increase in New Users (117) 
occurs after the enhanced disclosures of SFAS No. 161. These trends are consistent with evidence 
that accounting standards, namely SFAS Nos. 133/138, increased derivatives usage (Abdel-khalik 
and Chen 2015). Nevertheless, we take steps to mitigate the possibility that changes in accounting 
practices made existing Users appear to be New Users.11 We also examine the effects of these 
standards on analysts’ forecasts in Section 6.5. Panel B reports the industry distribution of each 
sample. Overall, firms in the manufacturing and business equipment industries comprise more than 
one-third of each group. Thus, where appropriate, we include industry and year fixed-effects. 
5. Research design 
 We use the focused setting of New Users and a difference-in-differences design to test our 
hypotheses. This approach offers four distinct advantages. First, it captures the dynamic, multi-
                                                            
10 To illustrate, consider a firm that did not use derivatives until 2006. From 1998 to 2005, observations for this firm 
are classified in the Non-User sample. In 2006, the observation is classified in the New User sample. If the firm does 
not continue to use derivatives in 2007, the observation for 2007 is classified in the Non-User sample. If, however, 
the firm continues to use derivatives in 2007, the observation for 2007 is classified in the User sample. Thus, New 
User designation only occurs the first time that derivatives usage is observed (after initially observing no usage). A 
small number of firms stop and later restart using derivatives; however, omitting them does not influence our results.   
11 In particular, a research assistant confirmed the initiation year for each New User by searching the entirety of Form 
10-K in prior years for any evidence of derivatives usage. We also test our hypotheses (unreported) after excluding 
New Users in the enactment year for each standard (2001; 2003; 2008). Inferences remain the same. 
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period setting in which analysts make decisions by evaluating changes in their earnings forecast 
properties before and after derivatives initiation. Second, it accounts for variation in an outcome 
(forecasts) that is not the result of treatment exposure (derivatives initiation) by comparing the 
treatment group to an untreated control group (Roberts and Whited 2013). Third, by examining 
the effects of derivatives initiation, it overcomes many methodological limitations, including the 
possibility of correlated omitted variables bias (Skinner 1996). Finally, it mitigates concerns that 
unobserved factors drive the relation between derivatives and analysts’ forecast properties.12 
5.1 Untreated control group 
 We use propensity score matching to identify a control group of Non-Users and account 
for the endogeneity in a firm’s decision to use derivatives. This nonparametric matching technique 
facilitates causal inference in non-experimental settings by constructing a control group that is 
similar to a treatment group (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983). Because a firm can be a Non-User in 
one year and a User in another year (Section 4), we limit potential control firms to those that do 
not use derivatives at any point during the sample period (“pure” Non-Users). We then estimate 
the propensity of derivatives initiation using the following probit regression model: 
   0 1 1 1 1Pr ,x y z k tit x it y it z it k it t it it
x y z k t
INIT RMI ACI CTRL IND YR                     (1) 
where INIT equals 1 for New Users (i.e., initiation) and 0 for “pure” Non-User observations. 
 Following Donohoe (2015b), RMI is a vector of risk management incentives that explain 
derivatives usage. It includes exposures to interest rate (IRISK), foreign exchange rate (FRISK), 
                                                            
12 Difference-in-differences assumes that in the absence of the treatment, average outcomes for treatment and control 
groups would have followed parallel paths over time. A direct test of this assumption is not possible because one 
cannot observe the absence of a treatment once it has occurred. However, placebo tests mitigate concerns that the 
parallel paths assumption is violated by falsely assuming that treatment occurs in a prior period. We conduct two 
(unreported) placebo tests by falsely assuming that derivatives initiation occurs either one or two years prior to 
initiation. We find insignificant coefficients for the difference-in-differences estimator, suggesting that the parallel 
paths assumption holds and our reported results are associated with derivatives initiation.  
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and commodity price (CRISK) risks as surveys reveal these are the risks most often managed with 
derivatives (Bodnar et al. 2003). By insulating firm value and cash flow from unfavorable changes 
in risk exposures, derivatives can thwart financial distress (Mayers and Smith 1982), harmonize 
financing and investment goals (Froot et al. 1993), and reduce agency conflicts (Smith and Stulz 
1985). We include financial distress likelihood (ALTZ), underinvestment likelihood (USCORE), 
and the sensitivity of executive compensation to firm value (ECSENS) to capture these incentives. 
We also include the cash effective tax rate (CETR) to reflect the tax planning features of derivatives 
(Donohoe 2015b). As derivatives substitutes, we control for convertible debt (CDEBT), preferred 
stock (PSTOCK), and abnormal accruals (ABACC).13 Lastly, the volatility in cash flow (CFV) and 
earnings (EV) reflect other general incentives for derivatives usage (Zhang 2009). By including 
RMI, the absence of derivatives among potential Non-User control firms reflects a choice not to 
use them, rather than no incentive to do so. All variables are defined in Appendix B.   
 ACI is a vector of analyst coverage factors, including the number of analysts following a 
firm (AFOL) and their related incentives, which influence earnings forecast properties.14 Following 
prior studies (Lang and Lundholm 1996; Barth et al. 2001; Tan et al. 2011), we include market 
value of equity (SIZE), intangibles (INTANG), stock return volatility (RETVOL), and the market-
to-book (MB) ratio. We also include stock and debt issuances (ISSUE), share turnover (TURNO), 
annual stock returns (ANRET), and earnings surprises (SURPRISE) to capture analysts’ tendency 
to cover firms that have more predictable performance and provide opportunities to earn higher 
                                                            
13 Convertible debt includes an embedded option on firm assets, which reduces the sensitivity of equity value to 
changes in firm value. Preferred stock reduces the probability of financial distress by paying periodic dividends as 
opposed to interest. These alternatives reduce the incentive to hedge with derivatives (Nance et al. 1993). Similarly, 
derivatives and accruals can serve as partial substitutes for smoothing earnings (Barton 2001). 
14 Because matching models do not require exclusion restrictions, the general rule is to include a comprehensive list 
of covariates when estimating propensity scores (Rubin 2009). Thus, while ACI is not directly related to derivatives 
usage, we include it in Eq. (1) to identify an untreated control group of Non-Users that is matched on as many relevant 
characteristics as possible. Nevertheless, excluding ACI from Eq. (1) yields similar inferences.  
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commissions (Hayes 1998; Lang et al. 2004). CTRL is a vector of controls that likely influence 
both derivatives usage and analyst decisions. We include geographic (GSC) and industry (ISC) 
sales concentration (Bushman et al. 2004) because firm-level complexity, apart from that relating 
to derivatives, can influence analysts’ decisions.15 We also control for profitability (ROA), foreign 
activity (FRGN), and mergers/acquisitions (M&A). Industry (IND) and year (YR) fixed-effects 
control for variation in the decision to initiate derivatives across industries and time, respectively.16  
 RMI, ACI, and CTRL are lagged (t−1) to avoid simultaneity with forecast properties in the 
hypothesis tests. The predicted probabilities from Eq. (1) are the propensity scores. We match each 
New User to only one “pure” Non-User as of the year before initiation by nearest propensity score, 
within common support, without replacement, using a caliper distance of 0.01. 
5.2 Difference-in-differences specification 
 We compare analysts’ earnings forecasts for the 561 New Users to those of the 561 Non-
User control firms (identified with Eq. [1]) with the following OLS regression: 
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For tests of accuracy (H1), the dependent variable (AEFA) is the negative absolute value of analyst 
forecast errors, scaled by price ([(|CEFit−EPSit|)/Pit]×−100, where CEFit, EPSit, and Pit are the most 
recent consensus annual earnings forecast, earnings per share, and price per share for firm i in 
period t, respectively). For tests of dispersion (H2), the dependent variable (AEFD) is the inter-
analyst standard deviation of earnings forecasts scaled by price ([SDit/Pit]×100, where SDit and Pit 
                                                            
15 GSC and ISC are revenue-based Herfindahl-Hirschman indices, where smaller values indicate less geographic and 
industry sales concentration, respectively, and thus more complexity (see Bushman et al. 2004). The inclusion of only 
one of these variables in the model at a time does not influence the results.  
16 In unreported tests, we replace year fixed-effects with indicators for the effective dates of derivatives accounting 
standards enacted during the sample period (SFAS Nos. 133/138, 149, 155, and 161). Inferences remain the same.  
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are the standard deviation of annual earnings forecasts and price per share, respectively).  
NEWUSER equals 1 for New User observations and 0 for control firm observations. POST 
is coded 1 for post-treatment periods (i.e., after initiation) for New Users and corresponding control 
firms (0 otherwise). The coefficient for NEWUSER (Ψ1) captures the difference in earnings forecast 
properties between New Users and control firms before derivatives initiation, and the coefficient 
for POST (Ψ2) reflects the change in forecast properties among control firms between pre- and 
post-initiation periods. Thus, the coefficient for NEWUSER×POST (Ψ3) captures the effect of 
initiation on forecast accuracy and dispersion for New Users relative to Non-User control firms 
(tests of H1 and H2, respectively). ACI and CTRL are as described above. Industry (IND) and year 
(YR) fixed-effects control for variation in forecast properties across industries and time, 
respectively, and clustered standard errors mitigate concerns about cross-correlated residuals.17   
6. Main results 
6.1 Descriptive statistics and univariate tests 
 Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for dependent variables, RMI, ACI, and CTRL, along 
with t-statistics for mean tests of differences between Non-Users and that of Users and New Users. 
Means tests of AEFA and AEFD reveal that analysts’ earnings forecasts for Non-Users are more 
accurate and less dispersed than those for Users and New Users. Mean tests for RMI, ACI, and 
CTRL indicate that Non-Users differ from Users and New Users across many dimensions, such as 
interest rate risk (IRISK), distress (ALTZ), analyst following (AFOL), intangibles (INTANG), return 
                                                            
17 Following McInnis and Collins (2011) and Donohoe (2015b), we construct pseudo pre/post-initiation periods for 
control firms based on when the matched New User initiates. Note that we omit the vector RMI from Eq. (2) as prior 
research suggests that risk management incentives are more apt to explain derivatives initiation than earnings forecast 
properties (Aretz and Bartram 2010). However, in unreported tests we include RMI and find similar results. In addition, 
several studies examine the effects of analyst-level factors (e.g., experience, brokerage size) on forecast properties 
(e.g., Clement and Tse 2005). We omit such factors from Eq. (2) because analyst-level tests would not address the 
issue of whether there are cross-firm differences in forecasts due to the complexity of derivatives. The inclusion of 
analyst-level factors would also mix analyst-level tests with firm-level tests by using matched firms to classify specific 
analyst forecasts. These caveats aside, we find similar results (unreported) using analyst-level data and controls.  
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volatility (RETVOL), and foreign activity (FRGN). Not surprisingly, Users and New Users are also 
larger (SIZE) and more complex (GSC, ISC) than Non-Users. Overall, the disparity across the three 
samples suggests that multivariate analyses with a matched sample will provide for more robust 
tests of the link between derivatives and analysts’ earnings forecast properties.18 
6.2 Untreated control group 
 We examine Pearson correlations (unreported) for the variables used to identify the control 
group of Non-Users (Eq. [1]). Notably, derivatives initiation (INIT) is significantly correlated with 
GSC (−0.125), ISC (−0.132), and SIZE (0.212). Thus, in Section 7, we examine if these other types 
of complexity or size drive our results. Other correlations are consistent with prior studies, while 
Variance Inflation Factors (unreported) indicate no issues with multicollinearity in any of our tests.  
 <INSERT TABLES 2–4 ABOUT HERE> 
 Table 3 reports the covariate balance between New Users and Non-User control firms 
identified with Eq. (1). If covariates are balanced, then differences in forecast properties can be 
attributed to derivatives initiation rather than other firm attributes. Reported amounts are p-values 
from tests of differences in means (t-test), medians (Wilcoxon rank-sum test), and distributions 
(Kolmogorov-Smirnov test) of RMI, ACI, and CTRL between the two samples. Propensity score 
matching does not require matched firms to be identical across all covariates (Caliendo and 
Kopeinig 2008). Of the 26 variables, only three (ECSENS, INTANG, and TURNO) are statistically 
dissimilar at a 90 percent confidence level. When all covariates are considered jointly, Hotelling’s 
T2-test (p =0.991) reveals that New Users and control firms are not different from one another. In 
sum, these results suggest the matching process was successful in balancing the control variables.19  
                                                            
18 We use the sample of Non-Users in Section 6.5. Unreported tests of differences between Non-Users and potential 
non-user control firms (“pure” Non-Users) indicate these two samples are similar along most dimensions. 
19 Our primary tests are susceptible to “hidden” bias if there are correlated omitted variables that are unbalanced across 
treatment and control groups. Although it is not possible to test if there are no unobserved variables that influence 
18 
 
6.3 Hypothesis tests 
 Table 4 reports estimates of Eq. (2). In Panel A, the dependent variable is analysts’ earnings 
forecast accuracy (AEFA). To assess the immediate effects of derivatives initiation, the tests in 
column (1) use data for the year immediately before (t−1) and upon (t) initiation for the sample of 
561 New Users and 561 matched control firms (2,224 firm-years). To assess the overall effects, 
column (2) reports results based on all available data before and after initiation (9,100 firm-years). 
The positive and significant coefficient for NEWUSER (3.091) in column (1) suggests earnings 
forecasts for New Users are more accurate than those for control firms before initiation, while the 
insignificant coefficients for POST in both columns imply no change in AEFA among control firms 
during the sample period. As tests of H1, the negative and significant coefficients for NEWUSER 
×POST (−5.288; −1.232) in both columns indicates that, relative to control firms, the accuracy of 
analysts’ earnings forecasts for New Users declines after initiation. Further, the coefficient for 
NEWUSER×POST is larger in column (1) than in column (2), suggesting that forecast accuracy 
improves over time as analysts adjust to New Users’ derivatives activity.  
 In Panel B, the dependent variable is analysts’ earnings forecast dispersion (AEFD). As 
tests of H2, the coefficients for NEWUSER×POST are positive and significant (0.832; 0.314) in 
both columns. These results suggest that, relative to control firms, analysts’ earnings forecasts for 
New Users are more dispersed after derivatives initiation. As with accuracy, a smaller coefficient 
for NEWUSER×POST in column (2) suggests the dispersion in earnings forecasts is attenuated, 
                                                            
treatment selection, there are tests for assessing the sensitivity of matched-pair results to such hidden bias (Rosenbaum 
2007). The central issue of these tests is how strongly an unmeasured variable must influence the selection process to 
undermine the matched-pair analysis (Becker and Caliendo 2007). Using the Mantel and Haenszel (1959) test statistic 
for binary outcomes, we find the results are insensitive to a bias that would affect the odds of derivatives initiation by 
a factor greater than 10. Although no strict benchmarks exist for gauging sensitivity (Armstrong et al. 2012), by 
comparison, if control firms were matched only by industry the results would be sensitive to a bias that less than 
doubled the odds of derivatives initiation. Thus, the primary results are robust to significant correlated omitted 
variables bias, largely because of the expansive controls included in the propensity score matching model (Eq. [1]). 
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but not eliminated, once analysts have time to adjust to derivatives initiation. The coefficients for 
control variables in both panels are also consistent with prior research. For example, the positive 
(negative) coefficients for ANRET and ROA in the accuracy (dispersion) tests are consistent with 
more accurate (less dispersed) earnings forecasts when analysts’ incentives to obtain and process 
information are stronger (i.e., for firms expected to perform well (Hayes 1998)). These (and other) 
coefficients are statistically significant despite covariate balance with control firms (Table 3) 
because changes in these characteristics in non-match years can influence analysts’ decisions.20  
 To gauge the overall economic effects of derivatives initiation on forecast properties, we 
estimate the percentage change in AEFA and AEFD for New Users from the pre-initiation to the 
post-initiation period using all available data. Following Tan et al. (2011), we first calculate the 
predicted values of AEFA and AEFD for New Users in the pre-initiation period (POST=0) with all 
independent variables in Eq. (2) held at the sample mean for New Users (hereafter, Predicted). We 
then compute the marginal effect of POST (from 0 to 1) on AEFA and AEFD for New Users, where 
all independent variables are held at the sample mean for New Users (hereafter, Marginal). The 
ratio of Marginal to Predicted is an estimate of the percentage change in AEFA and AEFD after 
initiation. We do not calculate these ratios for control firms as the marginal effects (POST in Table 
4) are not significant. For New Users, these (unreported) ratios indicate that forecast accuracy 
declines by 26% (−0.91/3.47) while dispersion increases by 27% (0.18/0.66). These estimates are 
economically large and analogous to the effects of other major changes in firms’ reporting 
                                                            
20 We verify that our results are robust to using strict one-to-one matching and a changes specification of difference-
in-differences (Roberts and Whited 2013). That is, we regress the change in AEFA (AEFD) between the pre- and post-
initiation period for New Users and control firm observations on NEWUSER and changes in ACI and CTRL. Inferences 
remain the same. To ensure that the results are not driven by changes in forecast properties among control firms, we 
also examine whether changes in forecast properties after initiation are statistically significant among only New Users. 
We estimate Eq. (2) using the time-series of New Users, such that POST is the variable of interest. The (unreported) 
coefficients for POST are negative and positive for AEFA and AEFD, respectively, indicating that the observed decline 
in AEFA and increase in AEFD after initiation are statistically significant (p-value<0.05) among only New Users.   
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practices on forecast properties (Tan et al. 2011). Note that these effects are based on the most 
conservative results in Table 4 and, thus, reflect a lower bound estimate of economic significance.  
6.4 Disentangling the economic and financial reporting complexities of derivatives 
 The hypothesis tests in Table 4 examine whether and how the economic and reporting 
complexities of derivatives jointly influence analysts’ earnings forecasts. We next evaluate if the 
observed decrease (increase) in forecast accuracy (dispersion) for New Users after derivatives 
initiation is driven by economic complexity, reporting complexity, or both. Because reporting 
standards are developed with economic factors in mind (Peterson 2012), discriminating between 
these two types of complexity is challenging. Thus, we conduct several tests of whether the 
accuracy and dispersion effects differ when aspects of derivatives initiation are more or less related 
to each type of complexity. Corroborating evidence across these tests will allow for stronger 
inferences about the link between earnings forecast properties and the complexity of derivatives. 
 We classify New Users based on whether they exhibit high or low complexity with respect 
to derivatives. In particular, we designate New Users that upon initiation (1) use at least two types 
of instruments (options, futures/forwards, swaps, other) or (2) significantly hedge at least two risk 
exposures (interest rates, foreign exchange rates, commodity prices) as having high economic 
complexity; low otherwise. We hand-collect information about the types of instruments held by 
New Users upon derivatives initiation from Form 10-Ks. To identify hedged risks, we sort changes 
in IRISK, FRISK, and CRISK for each New User at initiation (t−1 to t) into quintiles, and define a 
significant reduction as the top two quintiles. This grouping is based on the idea that uncertainty 
about the mapping of transactions into financial reports increases with the number of instruments 
and/or objectives for using the instruments (Peterson 2012).21  
                                                            
21 The use of quintiles to identify hedged risks alleviates the concern that small changes after initiation are artifacts of 
other factors, rather than indicators of economic complexity. The results are similar when we define reductions in risk 
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  We also classify New Users that initiate derivatives after the effective date for SFAS Nos. 
133 and 138 in June 2000, but before the effective date for SFAS No. 149 in June 2003, as having 
high reporting complexity; low otherwise. While derivatives reporting has always been complex 
(Ryan 2012), critics refer to SFAS No. 133 as “the poster child of complexity” (Leone 2007), a 
“fundamentally flawed loser” (Pollock 2005), and a “labyrinth of processes and documentation” 
(Valladares 2014). At issuance, neither SFAS No. 133 nor 138 were clear about (1) the conditions 
under which contracts were, in fact, derivatives, (2) whether different, yet comparable contracts 
should be accounted for in the same manner, and (3) many other issues (Pollock 2005; Ryan 2007). 
Such ambiguity and uncertainty adversely affects a firm’s ability to “properly apply [U.S. GAAP] 
and communicate the economic substance of a transaction,” as well as an analyst’s ability to assess 
“the economic substance of a transaction and the overall financial position and results” of a firm 
(SEC 2008). SFAS No. 149 and later standards repair these issues by amending the reporting of 
derivatives specified by SFAS No. 133 (see Appendix A). Hence, our definition of high reporting 
complexity reflects elements of reporting-related uncertainty noted by the ACIFR (SEC 2008) and, 
importantly, the most ambiguous reporting regime for derivatives during the sample period.   
   Using these classifications, we create four sample partitions: (1) high economic and high 
reporting complexity; (2) low economic and high reporting complexity; (3) high economic and 
low reporting complexity; and (4) low economic and low reporting complexity. We then modify 
Eq. (2), focusing on the effects of initiation in each partition. Specifically, we replace NEWUSER 
with two indicator variables: (1) NEW_P, which equals 1 for New Users in the partition of interest 
(0 otherwise), and (2) NEW_O, which equals 1 for all other New Users in the sample (0 otherwise). 
                                                            
exposures using other cutoffs. In unreported tests, we measure economic complexity using hand-collected data on the 
types of risks hedged by New Users upon initiation. Inferences remain the same, but we note that some firms are 
ambiguous as to whether initiation was in response to a specific risk exposure. Thus, our primary measure relies 
instead on ex post hedge performance and is highly correlated with the hand-collected data.  
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We then interact each variable with POST such that the coefficient for NEW_P×POST (NEW_O× 
POST) reflects the effects of initiation that (do not) relate to the partition of interest, all relative to 
control firms. Depending on the partition, the difference between these two interaction coefficients 
captures the incremental effect of economic and/or reporting complexity on analysts’ earnings 
forecast properties. We estimate this model using data for the year before (t−1) and upon (t) 
initiation for the sample of 561 New Users and 561 matched control firms (2,224 firm-years) to 
focus on the immediate effects of initiation. This approach alleviates a firm’s potential movement 
between the high and low complexity partitions over time as an alternative explanation.22   
 Panel A of Table 5 reports the results for each partition, where the dependent variable is in 
the column heading. For brevity, we tabulate only interaction coefficients. In Cell (1), the partition 
of interest is New Users with high economic and high reporting complexity as defined above. The 
significant coefficients for NEW_P×POST (−5.404; 0.835) indicate a decrease in earnings forecast 
accuracy (AEFA) and an increase in dispersion (AEFD) for New Users with these features upon 
initiation, relative to control firms. The insignificant coefficients for NEW_O×POST suggest no 
change in AEFA or AEFD for all other New Users. Further, the significant differences between the 
interaction coefficients in Cell (1) (−4.956; 1.047) indicate that New Users with high economic 
and high reporting complexity realize larger decreases (increases) in AEFA (AEFD) than other 
New Users. Conversely, in Cell (4), where the partition of interest is New Users with low economic 
and low reporting complexity, the insignificant coefficients for NEW_P×POST indicate no change 
in either AEFA or AEFD after initiation. Instead, the significant coefficients for NEW_O×POST 
(−9.508; 1.410) indicate a decrease (increase) in AEFA (AEFD) for all other New Users. 
                                                            
22 We also examine the overall effect of derivatives initiation by (1) defining economic complexity using changes in 
risk exposures in each year after initiation, and (2) estimating Eq. (2) using all available data before and after initiation 
(9,100 firm-years). The (unreported) results yield similar inferences.  
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<INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE> 
 To evaluate if the effects of initiation on each partition are incrementally significant across 
cells, we report Wald χ2-statistics, computed with Seemingly Unrelated Regression, in Panel B.23 
We first test if the coefficient differences (NEW_P×POST−NEW_O×POST) in Cell (1) are 
different from the coefficient differences in Cell (4). Consistent with our hypothesis tests, the 
differences (−13.684; 2.194) are statistically significant, suggesting the economic and reporting 
complexities of derivatives jointly influence analysts’ earnings forecast properties.   
 In Cell (2), the partition of interest is New Users with low economic and high reporting 
complexity. The significant coefficients for NEW_P×POST (−6.931; 2.033) and differences 
between interaction terms (−5.938; 1.819) in each column indicate a decrease (increase) in AEFA 
(AEFD) for New Users in this partition. However, in Cell (3), the coefficients for NEW_P×POST 
are insignificant, indicating no change in AEFA or AEFD for New Users with high economic and 
low reporting complexity.24 Panel B indicates that the interaction coefficient differences in Cell 
(1) do not differ from those in Cell (2), suggesting that when reporting complexity is high, relaxing 
economic complexity has no effect on the decrease (increase) in AEFA (AEFD). Wald χ2-tests 
between Cells (1) and (3), and Cells (2) and (4), are significant and reveal that high reporting 
complexity has a negative (positive) effect on AEFA (AEFD) regardless of the level of economic 
complexity. Similarly, Wald χ2-tests between Cells (2) and (3) are significant and indicate that 
when only one type of complexity is high, it is only New Users with high reporting complexity 
                                                            
23 To alleviate concerns about cross-correlated residuals, Seemingly Unrelated Regression combines the results in 
each cell and then tests whether the differences in interaction coefficients differ across cells (Greene 2007).  
24 Note that coefficients for NEW_P×POST (NEW_O×POST) in Cell (1) are not equal to those for NEW_O×POST 
(NEW_P×POST) in Cell (3) because the partition of interest (NEW_P) in each cell is based on a two-way sort of 
economic and reporting complexity with all other firms in the NEW_O partition. Thus, for each cell, the NEW_O 
partition reflects a different set of firms. For example, in Cell 1, NEW_P reflects the intersection of firms with high 
economic complexity (194 New Users) and high reporting complexity (217 New Users) with all other firms in the 
NEW_O partition. In Cell 3, however, NEW_P reflects the intersection of firms with high economic complexity (194 
New Users) and low reporting complexity (344 New Users) with all other firms in the NEW_O partition. 
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that realize an incremental decrease (increase) in AEFA (AEFD).  
 In sum, the decrease (increase) in earnings forecast accuracy (dispersion) for New Users 
after derivatives initiation is driven by reporting complexity. That is, the effects of derivatives on 
analysts’ earnings forecasts increase as reporting complexity varies from low to high, while 
variation in economic complexity has no effect on this relation. Thus, it is not the use of more than 
one type of derivative or the hedging of multiple risk exposures that complicates analysts’ 
assessment of derivatives users, but rather the financial reporting of such economic complexity.   
6.5 Structural break tests of financial reporting complexity 
 To further test whether reporting complexity influences analysts’ earnings forecasts, we 
test the structural stability of forecast properties over specific periods of time in the broader setting 
of Users. In this sense, structural stability is a statement about parameters, which has meaning in 
the context of an econometric model. An assumption of stationarity implies that model parameters 
(mean and variance) are constant over time. A structural break occurs if at least one parameter 
changes. Structural breaks can occur, for example, as a result of regulatory regime changes; that 
is, when one mix of reporting practices is replaced by another (Donohoe and McGill 2011).25 
 Extensive changes in reporting rules for derivatives during the sample period are likely to 
influence the decisions of analysts. The application of fair value-based accounting under SFAS 
No. 133 after 2000, and its subsequent repairs/amendments by SFAS Nos. 138, 149, and 155 
substantially altered the financial reports of derivatives users. Although these standards enhanced 
and clarified derivatives accounting, they permitted two distinct and basically inconsistent 
                                                            
25 We focus on Users because the difference-in-differences design is not feasible for regime-level tests. For instance, 
including regime indicators in Eq. (2) will result in few observations for some regimes and confound inferences by 
introducing a second treatment effect. An alternative is to estimate Eq. (2) by reporting regime. However, this approach 
makes it difficult to assess the effects of each standard as it excludes observations for firms that initiate derivatives in 
the last year of each regime. By excluding New Users, structural break tests focus on the effects of ongoing derivatives 
usage and alleviate the potential that firm-level changes upon initiation (e.g., risk exposures) drive the main results.  
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approaches to hedge accounting (see Appendix A). Further, SFAS No. 161, effective after 2008, 
required enhanced disclosures to address concerns that SFAS No. 133 did not provide adequate 
detail about how derivatives usage affects financial position, performance, and cash flow. If 
analysts’ decisions are indeed influenced by reporting complexity, we expect their earnings 
forecast properties to vary with these significant changes in the reporting practices of derivatives.  
 We modify Eq. (2) in three ways. First, we replace the difference-in-differences variables 
with an indicator variable, USER, identifying the User and Non-User samples. We then add four 
regime indicators that equal 1 for observations after fiscal-years June 2000 (SFAS133/138), June 
2003 (SFAS149), September 2006 (SFAS155), and November 2008 (SFAS161), respectively (0 
otherwise).26 Finally, we interact each indicator with USER such that the interaction coefficients 
capture structural breaks in forecast properties among Users in a given reporting regime. Thus, 
these tests focus on the effects of reporting complexity rather than economic complexity.27  
<INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE> 
 Panels A and B of Table 6 report structural break tests of AEFA and AEFD, respectively. 
The negative (positive) coefficient, −1.589 (0.319), for USER in column (1) of Panel A (B) reveals 
that, on average, analysts’ earnings forecasts for Users are less accurate (more disperse) than those 
for Non-Users. In column (2) of Panel A, the interaction coefficients indicate that forecast accuracy 
for Users declines after SFAS Nos. 133/138 (−1.665), but improves after SFAS No. 149 (1.353). 
Similarly, the interaction coefficients in column (2) of Panel B suggest that dispersion among 
                                                            
26 Although SFAS No. 133 had an original effective date of June 1999, the FASB delayed implementation by one 
year. In addition, SFAS No. 138, effective June 2000, amended several aspects of SFAS No. 133. Based on their close 
proximity, we use only one regime indicator (SFAS133/138) to reflect these two standards.  
27 Structural break analysis accounts for changes in both intercept and slope. In our model, the coefficients for the 
interactions (regime indicators) capture shifts in slope (intercept). We focus on interaction coefficients as they are 
indicative of a parameter change among derivatives users in a given reporting regime (Donohoe and McGill 2011).  
We do not consider economic complexity in these tests as we are interested in whether model parameters are non-
stationary over time. Moreover, our primary measure of economic complexity is based on observable reductions in 
risk exposures after derivatives initiation; New Users are not included in these tests.  
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Users increases after SFAS Nos. 133/138 (0.405), but declines after SFAS Nos. 149 (−0.268) and 
155 (−0.245). In contrast, the significant non-interacted coefficients in each panel suggest the 
opposite effect for Non-Users. For instance, the positive (negative) coefficient, 1.031 (−0.264), for 
SFAS133/138 in Panel A (B) indicates an increase (decrease) in AEFA (AEFD) for Non-Users after 
SFAS No. 133/138. Collectively, these tests help validate the main results by providing further 
evidence that forecast properties are indeed associated with changes in the reporting practices of 
derivatives. Note, however, that we do not infer causality between the regulatory events and 
analysts’ decisions. Instead, these results show a statistical relationship between trends in forecast 
properties and periods of time in which the FASB was actively changing derivatives reporting.   
7. Additional tests 
7.1 Ineffective management of financial risk 
 Corporate use of derivatives is often motivated by their ability to hedge (reduce) the risk 
of unfavorable changes in interest rates, foreign exchange rates, and commodity prices (Guay and 
Kothari 2003; Bartram et al. 2009). However, some firms fail to hold effective hedges or 
intentionally speculate (e.g., Hentschel and Kothari 2001). These distinctions are important for 
analysts as many of the key benefits of derivatives, such as less volatile earnings and cash flow, 
only result from effective hedging (see Section 2). Thus, we consider whether analysts’ forecast 
properties are influenced by how successfully firms use derivatives to manage risk exposures.    
 We first classify New Users as effective or speculative/ineffective hedgers following Zhang 
(2009).28 We estimate three models quantifying how New Users’ exposures to IRISK, FRISK, and 
                                                            
28 Zhang (2009) introduces a procedure for identifying firms that reduce specific risk exposures after holding all of 
their derivatives positions. We use this procedure because (1) it provides a reasonable ex post assessment of hedge 
effectiveness as few firms disclose parameters that help discern the extent to which a risk exposure is hedged (Kawaller 
2004), and (2) by focusing on outcomes, it is not confounded by a firm’s discretion in hedge designation or choice to 
practice hedge accounting. See Zhang (2009) for estimation details. We make two modifications to quantify factors 
of FRISK: (1) we use foreign income (pifo in Compustat) as an explanatory variable rather than foreign sales; and (2) 
due to data availability, we omit the sum of industry imports and exports as an explanatory variable.  
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CRISK relate to firm characteristics prior to derivatives usage. Using the resulting coefficients, we 
compute New Users’ expected risk exposures after using derivatives. We designate a New User as 
an effective hedger if any risk exposure is less than expected after initiation. Of the 561 New Users, 
505 are classified as an effective hedger (EH); speculative/ineffective otherwise.  
 We then estimate Eq. (2) with two modifications for both the immediate and overall effects 
of initiation. First, we replace NEWUSER with (1) an indicator variable equal to 1 for effective 
hedgers (0 otherwise), and (2) an indicator variable equal to 1 for speculative/ineffective hedgers 
(0 otherwise). Second, we interact these two variables with POST. Consistent with the main results, 
we find evidence of a decrease (increase) in forecast accuracy (dispersion) after initiation for both 
effective and speculative/ineffective hedgers. However, these changes in forecast properties are 
not statistically different between the two groups, indicating that analysts’ earnings forecasts for 
effective hedgers are neither less accurate nor more dispersed than those for speculative/ineffective 
hedgers. Thus, despite the earnings insulating benefits of effective hedging, these (unreported) 
results suggest that analysts are no better at forecasting the earnings of successful hedgers.29 
7.2 Analyst sales forecasts 
 The hypothesis tests are based on analysts’ estimates of “Street” earnings, which refer to 
the performance metrics tracked by analyst estimate clearinghouse services and announced by 
firms in press releases (Bradshaw and Sloan 2002). These earnings numbers often exclude 
expenses that are required under generally accepted accounting principles, such as “special” and 
“noncash” items. Because derivatives can result in special and/or non-cash items (e.g., unrealized 
gains and losses), some analysts might exclude the effects of derivatives from their earnings 
                                                            
29 As noted in Section 2, SFAS No. 133 altered the financial reporting environment for derivatives by making hedge 
ineffectiveness more apparent than under prior rules. Because our sample begins two years before SFAS No. 133, we 
repeat these tests excluding 1998 and 1999. Inferences remain the same.  
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forecasts. However, many derivatives directly affect core earnings items, such as revenue and cost 
of goods sold.30 Thus, derivatives can influence analysts’ earnings forecast properties regardless 
of whether their effects are fully embedded in “Street” earnings. To examine this possibility, we 
test the immediate and overall effects of initiation on the properties of analysts’ sales forecasts.  
 We estimate Eq. (2) after replacing the dependent variable with either analyst sales forecast 
accuracy (ASFA) or dispersion (ASFD). Similar to Table 4, we find a negative (positive) and 
significant coefficient for NEWUSER×POST when ASFA (ASFD) is the dependent variable. These 
(unreported) results suggest that analysts’ sales forecasts for New Users are less accurate (more 
dispersed) than those for control firms after initiation. Thus, the complexity of derivatives likely 
impedes forecast accuracy and increases dispersion (i.e., less herding) even if analysts exclude 
derivatives-related information from their estimates of “Street” earnings. 
7.3 Firm complexity and size 
 The use of a difference-in-differences design with an untreated control group and numerous 
covariates alleviates many alternative explanations. However, we conduct two additional tests to 
further mitigate the concern that other types of complexity and/or firm size (rather than derivatives) 
drive the main results. First, we estimate Eq. (2) with two modifications. We replace NEWUSER 
with (1) an indicator variable equal to 1 for New Users in the lowest decile of either GSC or ISC, 
the two complexity measures in our model (0 otherwise), and (2) an indicator variable equal to 1 
for New Users not in the lowest decile of either measure (0 otherwise). We then interact these 
variables with POST. Second, we partition New Users by the highest decile of SIZE in the same 
manner. For tests of complexity, we find no significant differences between interaction coefficients 
when either AEFA or AEFD is the dependent variable. For tests of SIZE, we find that the effects 
                                                            
30 For example, by entering a forward contract, coffee growers can lock in sales prices while coffee buyers (the 
counterparty) can insulate their cost of goods sold from fluctuating coffee prices.  
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of derivatives initiation on analyst earnings forecast properties are insignificant for the largest New 
Users. Together, these (unreported) results suggest the immediate and overall effects of initiation 
on analysts’ earnings forecast properties are not driven by firm complexity or firm size. 
8. Conclusion 
We examine whether and how the complexity of derivatives influences the properties of 
earnings forecasts issued by analysts. Using the focused setting of new derivatives users and a 
difference-in-differences design, we find that analysts’ earnings forecasts for firms that begin using 
derivatives during the sample period (1998-2011) are less accurate and more dispersed. Further 
tests indicate that it is not the use of more than one type of derivative or hedging of multiple risk 
exposures that hinders analysts’ assessment of derivatives users, but rather the financial reporting 
of such economic complexity. Overall, the evidence suggests that, despite their financial expertise, 
analysts routinely misjudge the earnings implications of firms’ derivatives activity. However, a 
series of derivatives accounting standards has helped analysts improve their forecasts over time. 
We note three key caveats. First, a firm’s decision to use derivatives is determined, in part, 
by unobservable factors, making it difficult to eliminate all alternative explanations. However, we 
mitigate many of the major concerns by (1) using propensity score matching and a difference-in-
differences design; (2) validating our findings in the broader setting of derivatives users; and (3) 
evaluating if ineffective risk management, estimates of “Street” earnings, or firm complexity and 
size drive the results. Second, we note that our structural break tests among derivatives users 
preclude any inferences other than a statistical relation. Finally, the effects of derivatives on 
analysts’ forecasts could vary depending on whether a firm hedges a majority or a small portion 
of its risk exposures (Ryan 2012). While current disclosure practices limit the ability of researchers 
to obtain such information, we believe this is an issue that should be addressed by future research. 
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Appendix A 
Changes in derivatives accounting/disclosure practices during the sample period 
 
SFAS No. 133, Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities (FASB 1998), and SFAS 
No. 138, Accounting for Certain Derivative Instruments and Certain Hedging Activities (FASB 2000). 
SFAS No. 133 establishes accounting and reporting standards for derivative instruments, including certain 
derivative instruments embedded in other contracts, and for hedging activities. It requires that an entity 
recognize all derivatives as either assets or liabilities in the statement of financial position and measure 
those instruments at fair value. Under this standard, an entity can elect to apply hedge accounting whereby 
effective hedges minimize income statement volatility. The standard amends existing accounting standards, 
including SFAS No. 52, Foreign Currency Translation, No. 80, Accounting for Futures Contracts, and No. 
119, Disclosure about Derivative Financial Instruments and Fair Value of Financial Instruments, and 
integrates them into one unified standard. Although SFAS No. 133 had an original effective date of June 
1999, the FASB later delayed implementation by one year. SFAS No. 138, effective June 2000, amended 
several aspects of SFAS No. 133. For instance, a prior standard (SFAS No. 52) required that any gain or 
loss on a hedged foreign currency denominated underlying be reported in earnings, whereas SFAS No. 133 
required the gain or loss on the related derivative be closed to OCI. Because this accounting treatment left 
income “exposed,” SFAS No. 138 requires special cash flow hedge accounting whereby an amount equal 
to the gain or loss on the hedged items is removed from OCI and recognized in income. 
 
SFAS No. 149, Amendment of Statement 133 on Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities (FASB 
2003). This standard amends and clarifies accounting and reporting for derivative instruments specified by 
SFAS No. 133. The standard requires that contracts with comparable characteristics be accounted for in a 
similar manner and provides a more precise definition of derivatives contracts. These changes aim to 
standardize the reporting of contracts as either derivatives or hybrid instruments. Effective June 30, 2003. 
 
SFAS No. 155, Accounting for Certain Hybrid Financial Instruments (an amendment of SFAS No. 133 
and 140) (FASB 2006). This standard eliminates the exemption from applying SFAS No. 133 to interests 
in securitized financial assets so that similar instruments are accounted for similarly regardless of 
instrument form. It also allows a preparer to elect fair value measurement at acquisition, issuance, or when 
a previously recognized financial instrument is subject to a re-measurement event (on an instrument by 
instrument basis). A fair value measurement election allows more financial instruments to be measured at 
fair value, reflecting the FASB’s movement toward fair value. Effective September 15, 2006. 
 
SFAS No. 161 Disclosures about Derivatives Instruments and Hedging Activities (an amendment of SFAS 
No. 133) (FASB 2008). This standard amends and expands the disclosure requirements of SFAS No. 133 
with the intent to provide users of financial statements with an enhanced understanding of why an entity 
uses derivative instruments, and how such instruments and hedge items are accounted for and impact 
financial statements. To meet these objectives, this standard requires qualitative disclosures about 
objectives and strategies for using derivatives, quantitative disclosures about fair value amounts and gains 
and losses on derivative instruments, and disclosures about credit-risk-related contingent features in 
derivative agreements. Effective November 15, 2008. 
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Appendix B 
Variable definitionsa 
 
Dependent variables 
 
AEFA Analyst earnings forecast accuracy, defined as the absolute value of the difference 
between the consensus annual earnings forecast and the actual earnings scaled by stock 
price at end of year t for firm i. We multiply the result by −100 such that greater values 
indicate more accurate forecasts. More specifically, [(|CEFit−EPSit|)/Pit]×−100, where 
CEFit, EPSit, and Pit are the most recent consensus annual earnings forecast (obtained 
from the I/B/E/S summary file), earnings per share, and year-end price per share for firm 
i in period t, respectively. See Lang and Lundholm (1996). 
 
AEFD Analyst earnings forecast dispersion, defined as the inter-analyst standard deviation of 
annual earnings forecasts deflated by stock price at end of year t for firm i. We then 
multiply the result by 100. More specifically, [SDit/Pit]×100, where SDit and Pit, are the 
standard deviation of annual earnings forecasts (obtained from the I/B/E/S summary file) 
and year-end price per share for firm i in period t, respectively. See Lang and Lundholm 
(1996).  
 
Variables of interest 
 
NEWUSER Indicator variable equal to 1 for all New User firm observations and 0 for all matched 
control firm observations.   
 
POST Indicator variable equal to 1 for both New User and matched control firm observations 
in periods after derivatives initiation; 0 otherwise. 
 
Risk management incentives (RMI) 
 
IRISK Interest rate risk exposures, defined as the absolute value of the estimated coefficient 
from a regression of firms’ monthly holding period stock returns on the monthly 
percentage change in the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) for 36 months prior 
to fiscal-year end. See Guay (1999), Zhang (2009), and Donohoe (2015b). 
 
FRISK Foreign currency exchange rate risk exposures, defined as the absolute value of the 
estimated coefficient from a regression of firms’ monthly holding period stock returns 
on the monthly percentage change in the Federal Reserve Board trade-weighted U.S. 
dollar index for 36 months prior to fiscal-year end. See Guay (1999), Zhang (2009), and 
Donohoe (2015b). 
 
CRISK Commodity price risk exposures, defined as the absolute value of the estimated 
coefficient from a regression of firms’ monthly holding period stock returns on the 
monthly percentage change in the Producer Price Index for 36 months prior to fiscal-year 
end. See Guay (1999), Zhang (2009), and Donohoe (2015b). 
 
ALTZ Likelihood of entering financial distress, defined as the modified Altman-Z score based 
on parameter weights reported by Shumway (2001).   
 
USCORE Likelihood of underinvestment, defined by first ranking cash flow from operations 
(oancf), debt-to-assets ratio (lt/at), and scores from a factor analysis of four growth 
opportunity measures (prior investment activity, geometric growth in market value of 
assets, market-to-book ratio, and research and development into deciles by year and 
industry. Decile ranks for debt-to-asset ratios and growth opportunity factor scores are 
then added to the reverse decile rank for cash flow from operations, with the result scaled 
by 30 (total possible points). See Donohoe (2015b). 
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ECSENS Sensitivity of executive compensation to firm value, defined by first computing the dollar 
change in value of CEO stock and option holdings that would result from a one 
percentage point increase in the stock price of the firm (0.01×prcc_f×[shrown_tot+ 
opt_unex_exer_num]). The result is then normalized by the sum of CEO salary and bonus 
(salary+bonus) to capture the share of total CEO compensation that would result from a 
one percentage point increase in firm value. Compensation data obtained from 
Execucomp. See Bergstresser and Philippon (2006).    
CETR Cash effective tax rate (3-year), defined as the three-year sum (t to t+2) of worldwide 
cash taxes paid (txpd) divided by the three-year sum (t to t+2) of pre-tax book income 
(pi) less special items (spi). ETRs are reset to 1 (0) if greater (less) than 1 (0). See Dyreng 
et al. (2008). 
 
CDEBT Convertible debt, defined as convertible debt (dcvt) divided by lagged total assets (at). 
 
PSTOCK Preferred stock, defined as preferred stock (pstk) divided by lagged total assets (at). 
 
ABACC Abnormal accruals, based on the performance-matched modified Jones model.  
 
CFV Cash flow volatility, defined as the standard deviation of quarterly operating cash flows 
(oancfy, adjusted to reflect quarterly data) during the most recent two years.  
 
EV Earnings volatility, defined as the standard deviation of quarterly earnings before 
extraordinary items (ibq) during the most recent two years. 
 
Analyst coverage incentives (ACI) 
 
AFOL Analyst following, defined as the total number of analysts following firm i in year t 
(obtained from the I/B/E/S detail file).  
 
SIZE  Log of equity market value (prcc_f×csho) at beginning of year t.  
 
INTANG Ratio of intangible assets (intan) to total assets (at) at beginning of year t.  
 
RETVOL Return volatility, defined as the standard deviation of monthly stock returns for firm i at 
year t−1. Ranked into deciles, where decile ranks are transformed by dividing the rank 
by 9 and subtracting 0.5 such that values range from −0.50 to 0.50. 
 
MB Market to book ratio, defined as equity market value (prcc_f×csho) divided by book 
value of equity (at−lt−pstkl+txditc+dcvt) at beginning of year t. 
 
ISSUE Indicator variable equal to 1 if firm issues equity or debt greater than 5 percent of total 
assets in year t; 0 otherwise.  
 
TURNO Stock turnover, defined as the number of shares traded in year t, divided by the average 
number of shares outstanding in year t.  
 
ANRET Annual stock return for firm i in year t−1, adjusted for contemporaneous annual market 
return. 
 
SURPRISE Earnings surprise, defined as the absolute value of the difference between earnings per 
share in year t and year t−1, divided by stock price at the beginning of year t.  
 
Control variables (CTRL) 
 
GSC Geographic sales concentration, defined as the sum of squares of (firm sales in each 
geographic segment / total firm sales) (obtained from the Compustat Segments File). 
 
ISC Industry sales concentration, defined as the sum of squares of (firm sales in each industry 
segment / total firm sales) (obtained from the Compustat Segments File). 
37 
 
ROA Return on assets, defined as income before extraordinary items (ib) divided by total assets 
(at) at beginning of year t.  
 
FRGN Indicator variable equal to 1 if foreign income or loss (pifo) is not equal to 0; 0 otherwise. 
 
M&A Indicator variable equal to 1 if cash flow from mergers and acquisitions (aqc) is not equal 
to 0; 0 otherwise.  
 
Other variables 
 
INIT     Indicator variable equal to 1 for New Users and 0 for “pure” Non-Users observations 
(i.e., firms that do not use derivatives at any point during the sample period). 
 
NEW_P          Indicator variable equal to 1 for New Users in the partition of interest for tests of high      
versus low economic and/or reporting complexity; 0 otherwise.  
 
NEW_O Indicator variable equal to 1 for New Users other than those in the partition of interest 
for tests of high versus low economic and/or reporting complexity; 0 otherwise.  
 
USER Indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm reports a position in derivatives in both fiscal 
years t and t−1 (i.e., a User, but not a New User); 0 if the firm does not report a position 
in derivatives. This variable identifies the User (=1) and Non-User (=0) samples.  
 
SFAS133/138 Indicator variable equal to 1 for observations after fiscal-year June 2000; 0 otherwise. 
 
SFAS149 Indicator variable equal to 1 for observations after fiscal-year June 2003; 0 otherwise. 
 
SFAS155 Indicator variable equal to 1 for observations after fiscal-year September 2006; 0 
otherwise. 
 
SFAS161 Indicator variable equal to 1 for observations after fiscal-year November 2008; 0 
otherwise. 
 
EH Indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm effectively hedges (reduces) its exposure to 
interest rate (IRISK), foreign exchange rate (FRISK), or commodity price (CRISK) risks 
relative to expectations after derivatives initiation; 0 otherwise. We define risk exposure 
reductions in the bottom decile as immaterial. See Zhang (2009) for details. 
 
ASFA Analyst sales forecast accuracy, defined as the absolute value of the difference between 
the consensus sales forecast and the actual sales (per share) scaled by stock price at end 
of year t for firm i (obtained from the I/B/E/S summary file). We multiply the result by 
−100 such that greater values indicate more accurate forecasts.   
 
ASFD Analyst sales forecast dispersion, defined as the inter-analyst standard deviation of sales 
forecasts deflated by stock price at end of year t for firm i. We then multiply the result 
by 100. More specifically, [SDit/Pit]×100, where SDit and Pit are the standard deviation 
of sales forecasts (per share) and year-end price per share, respectively, for firm i in 
period t (obtained from the I/B/E/S summary file). 
 
     aCompustat mnemonics in parentheses. 
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Table 1 
Characteristics of Non-Users, Users, and New Users 
 
Panel A: Temporal distribution of sample observations by derivatives reporting regimea 
 
 
 
 
  1/1/98 to  6/15/00 to  6/30/03 to  9/15/06 to  11/15/08 to Total 
 6/14/00  6/29/03  9/14/06  11/14/08  12/31/11  
Non-Users 1,299 2,969 2,868 1,684 1,972 10,792
Users 755 2,558 3,442 2,314 2,931 12,000
New Users 43 217 117 67 117 561
  Total 2,097 5,744 6,427 4,065 5,020 23,353
 
Panel B: Industry distribution of sample observations  
 
Non-Users  Users  New Users 
Industry groupb Obs. %  Obs. %  Obs. % 
Consumer Non-Durables 492 5 949 8 23 4
Consumer Durables 334 3 439 4 26 5
Manufacturing 965 9 2,321 19 90 16
Energy & Extraction 220 2 831 7 16 3
Chemicals & Allied Products 144 1 570 5 9 2
Business Equipment 3,257 30 2,424 20 170 30
Telecommunications 260 2 474 4 21 4
Wholesale & Retail 1,565 15 1,395 12 78 14
Healthcare 2,016 19 997 8 58 10
Constr., Transport. & Services 1,539 14 1,600 13 70 12
  Total 10,792 12,000 561
This table presents characteristics of Non-Users, Users, and New Users. Panel A illustrates the temporal distribution of sample observations, and Panel B 
reports industry distributions. A firm is a New User if it did not report a position in derivatives when it first appears in the sample, but did in a subsequent 
year. Firms enter the New User sample only when derivatives usage is first observed after initially observing no usage (see footnote 10 for an example). A 
firm is a User if it reports a position in derivatives at the end of both fiscal years t and t−1 (i.e., uses derivatives, but is not a new user), and a Non-User if 
it reports no position in derivatives at fiscal year-end. aConsistent with prior studies (Guay 1999; Donohoe 2015b), the sum of Users and New Users in a 
given year does not necessarily equal the amount of Users in the subsequent year because a firm can enter the sample for the first time as a User, but not a 
New User. bFama-French industry groups are available at: http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/Faculty/ken.french/datalibrary.html.  
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics 
 
  (1)  (2) (3) 
  Non-Users  Users New Users 
  Mean Median  Mean Median t-stat [(1)−(2)] Mean Median t-stat [(1)−(3)]
Dependent variables 
  AEFA  −4.681 −0.450  −5.451 −0.658 1.85 −7.158 −0.533 5.71  
  AEFD  0.747 0.146  0.952 0.124 −3.80 1.244 0.162 −7.35  
Risk management incentives (RMI) 
  IRISK  0.006 0.003  0.004 0.002 24.64 0.005 0.003 3.96  
  FRISK  0.024 0.018  0.018 0.013 24.32 0.025 0.017 −0.96  
  CRISK  0.031 0.019  0.020 0.013 26.49 0.030 0.018 2.41  
  ALTZ  5.951 4.076  3.403 2.675 34.93 3.553 2.714 7.20  
  USCORE  0.545 0.533  0.527 0.533 9.04 0.542 0.533 0.10  
  ECSENS  0.079 0.000  0.113 0.056 −27.94 0.068 0.018 2.72  
  CETR  0.175 0.099  0.207 0.185 −11.50 0.205 0.171 −3.41  
  CDEBT  0.028 0.000  0.027 0.000 1.04 0.050 0.000 −5.23  
  PSTOCK  0.004 0.000  0.003 0.000 2.65 0.005 0.000 −0.72  
  ABACC  −0.012 −0.006  −0.015 −0.008 1.61 −0.022 −0.014 1.14  
  CFV  0.038 0.028  0.027 0.020 26.09 0.033 0.024 3.93  
  EV  0.033 0.015  0.019 0.009 17.62 0.023 0.011 3.53  
Analyst coverage incentives (ACI) 
  AFOL  7.404 5.000  10.969 9.000 −33.67 9.513 7.000 −6.53  
  SIZE  5.832 5.729  7.129 7.053 −59.27 6.422 6.317 −9.72  
  INTANG  0.124 0.051  0.172 0.111 −20.94 0.178 0.109 −7.57  
  RETVOL  0.228 0.278  0.073 0.056 39.47 0.168 0.167 4.34  
  MB  3.103 2.074  2.334 1.686 16.95 2.898 2.053 1.34  
  ISSUE  0.069 0.000  0.105 0.000 −9.66 0.064 0.000 0.75  
  TURNO  2.111 1.529  2.170 1.691 −2.49 2.422 1.884 −4.82  
  ANRET  0.143 −0.003  0.117 0.022 3.26 0.165 0.004 −1.22  
  SURPRISE  0.095 0.027  0.087 0.024 2.86 0.073 0.024 3.31  
Control variables (CTRL) 
  GSC  0.770 0.896  0.643 0.595 32.92 0.720 0.763 6.06  
  ISC  0.813 1.000  0.693 0.690 31.99 0.730 0.837 8.29  
  ROA  −0.025 0.036  0.028 0.043 −23.95 0.014 0.042 −5.30  
  FRGN  0.476 0.000  0.691 1.000 −33.78 0.643 1.000 −8.83  
  M&A  0.400 0.000  0.578 1.000 −27.25 0.545 1.000 −6.88  
Obs.  10,792  12,000 561 
This table reports descriptive statistics, along with t-statistics for mean tests of differences between Non-Users 
and that of Users and New Users (assuming unequal variance). Continuous variables are winsorized at 1st and 
99th percentiles. Bold t-statistics denote statistical significance of at least 0.10 (two-tailed). Variables are defined 
in Appendix B.  
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Table 3 
Covariate balance  
 
 Mean Difference Median Difference Distributional Difference
 p-value  p-value  p-value 
Risk management incentives (RMI) 
  IRISK 0.937  0.387  0.331 
  FRISK 0.846  0.745  0.457 
  CRISK 0.321  0.714  0.759 
  ALTZ 0.481  0.175  0.116 
  USCORE 0.760  0.840  1.000 
  ECSENS 0.032**  0.000***  0.000*** 
  CETR 0.951  0.690  0.826 
  CDEBT 0.340  0.213  0.864 
  PSTOCK 0.762  0.447  1.000 
  ABACC 0.842  0.656  0.457 
  CFV 0.682  0.866  0.851 
  EV 0.757  0.218  0.295 
Analyst coverage incentives (ACI) 
  AFOL 0.693  0.453  0.891 
  SIZE 0.975  0.930  0.900 
  INTANG 0.009***  0.003***  0.016** 
  RETVOL 0.206  0.268  0.261 
  MB 0.973  0.769  0.986 
  ISSUE 0.510  0.510  1.000 
  TURNO 0.130  0.031**  0.037** 
  ANRET 0.242  0.797  0.851 
  SURPRISE 0.579  0.213  0.370 
Control variables (CTRL) 
  GSC 0.395  0.272  0.370 
  ISC 0.807  0.603  0.792 
  ROA 0.796  0.379  0.237 
  FRGN 0.678  0.678  1.000 
  M&A 0.770  0.770  0.102 
Hotelling’s T2 0.991     
This table reports the covariate balance between the 561 New Users and 561 propensity score matched control 
firms in the match year. Reported values are p-values for tests of differences in means (t-tests), medians 
(Wilcoxon rank-sum test), and distributions (Kolmogorov-Smirnov homogeneous distributions test) of matching 
variables (Eq. [1]). Hotelling’s T2 test is the multivariate equivalent of the two-sample t-test and considers 
whether the vector of all variable means differ between the two groups. *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance levels of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively (two-tailed). Variables are defined in Appendix B. 
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Table 4 
Difference-in-differences tests of analyst earnings forecast properties 
 
Panel A: Analyst earnings forecast accuracy (AEFA) 
  (1)  (2) 
  Immediate Effects Overall Effects
  Coeff.  RSE  Coeff.  RSE 
  Intercept  −6.515 10.492 −1.469  2.434
  NEWUSER      3.091 * 1.853 0.009  0.499
  POST  0.486  1.364 0.318  0.448
  NEWUSER×POST [H1] −5.288 ** 2.287 −1.232 ** 0.607
Analyst coverage incentives (ACI) 
  AFOL  0.096  0.093 0.058  0.039
  SIZE  0.433  0.614 0.112  0.219
  INTANG  0.407  4.220 0.840  1.524
  RETVOL  −0.822 ** 0.323 −0.600  0.933
  MB  −0.085  0.127 −0.014  0.048
  ISSUE  0.257  1.733 −0.327  0.762
  TURNO  0.454  0.280 −0.447 ** 0.180
  ANRET  2.496 ** 1.015 0.591 * 0.315
  SURPRISE  −0.042  0.041 −0.182 *** 0.033
Control variables (CTRL) 
  GSC  −3.132  2.719 −1.198  0.971
  ISC  0.556  3.838 −0.688  0.731
  ROA  0.232 *** 0.084 0.275 *** 0.034
  FRGN  −0.774  2.267 −0.552  0.609
  M&A  −0.679  1.073 0.051  0.342
Industry  Included  Included 
Year Included  Included 
Adjusted R2 0.21  0.19 
Observations 2,244  9,100 
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Panel B: Analyst earnings forecast dispersion (AEFD) 
  (1)  (2) 
  Immediate Effects Overall Effects
  Coeff.  RSE  Coeff.  RSE 
  Intercept  −0.330 0.734 2.542  0.185
  NEWUSER      −0.071  0.136 −0.048  0.110
  POST  0.052  0.091 −0.136  0.089
  NEWUSER×POST [H2] 0.832 ** 0.385 0.314 ** 0.128
Analyst coverage incentives (ACI) 
  AFOL  −0.032 ** 0.015 −0.010  0.003
  SIZE  0.111  0.078 −0.045  0.016
  INTANG  −0.205  0.435 −0.731 ** 0.105
  RETVOL  0.022  0.038 0.482 ** 0.071
  MB  −0.008  0.012 −0.009  0.003
  ISSUE  −0.369 *** 0.141 0.113  0.042
  TURNO  0.126 ** 0.053 0.048  0.011
  ANRET  −0.270 *** 0.092 −0.156 ** 0.026
  SURPRISE  0.027  0.018 0.028 *** 0.006
Control variables (CTRL) 
  GSC  −0.124  0.403 0.075  0.207
  ISC  0.012  0.259 0.051  0.135
  ROA  −0.029 *** 0.006 −0.049 *** 0.006
  FRGN  0.091  0.227 −0.107  0.145
  M&A  0.193  0.164 −0.181  0.065
Industry  Included  Included 
Year Included  Included 
Adjusted R2 0.23  0.19 
Observations 2,244  9,100 
This table reports tests of whether the economic and reporting complexities relating to derivatives initiation 
jointly influence analyst earnings forecast properties (Eq. [2]), where the dependent variable is AEFA in Panel 
A and AEFD in Panel B. NEWUSER equals 1 for New User firm observations and 0 for matched control firm 
observations. POST equals 1 for periods after derivatives initiation for New Users and corresponding control 
firms (0 otherwise). The coefficients for NEWUSER, POST, and NEWUSER×POST reflect (a) differences in 
analyst earnings forecast properties between New Users and control firms during the pre-initiation period, (b) 
the change in the analyst earnings forecast properties among control firms between pre- and post-initiation 
periods, and (c) the difference-in-differences estimator of the effect of derivatives initiation on analyst earnings 
forecast properties for New Users relative to control firms, respectively. To assess the immediate effects of 
initiation, column (1) uses data for the year immediately before (t−1) and upon (t) initiation for the sample of 
561 New Users and 561 matched control firms (2,244 firm-years). Column (2) reports results based on all 
available data before and after initiation (9,100 firm-years) to assess the overall effects of initiation. *, **, and 
*** denote statistical significance levels of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively (two-tailed). Robust standard errors 
(RSE) are clustered by firm (Petersen 2009). Variables are defined in Appendix B. 
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Table 5 
Disentangling the economic and financial reporting complexities of derivatives 
 
Panel A: Difference-in-difference tests of analyst earnings forecast properties by type of complexity (immediate effects) 
 
   Economic Complexity 
   High   Low 
   Accuracy (AEFA) Dispersion (AEFD)  Accuracy (AEFA) Dispersion (AEFD)
   Coeff.  RSE  Coeff.  RSE   Coeff.  RSE  Coeff.  RSE 
R
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NEW_P×POST    βa −5.404 ** 2.307  0.835 ** 0.386   −6.931 ** 2.974  2.033 ** 0.991
NEW_O×POST    βb −0.448  3.092  −0.212  0.410   −0.993  3.050  0.214  0.275
 ACI  Included  Included   Included  Included 
 CTRL Included  Included   Included  Included 
 Industry Included  Included   Included  Included 
  H0: βa−βb=0 [F-stat] −4.956  [3.06**]  1.047  [5.80***]   −5.938  [1.90*]  1.819  [3.19**] 
  Adjusted R2 0.05  0.10   0.05  0.10 
  Observations 2,244  2,244 (1) (2) 2,244  2,244 
L
o
w
 
NEW_P×POST    βa −1.179  3.027  0.308  0.323 (3) (4) −0.780  1.907  0.263  0.343
NEW_O×POST    βb −6.558 ** 2.862  0.970 ** 0.465   −9.508 ** 4.307  1.410 ** 0.716
 ACI Included  Included   Included  Included 
 CTRL Included  Included   Included  Included 
 Industry Included  Included   Included  Included 
 H0: βa−βb=0 [F-stat] 5.379  [1.66*]  −0.662  [1.70*]   8.728  [3.07**]  −1.147  [2.00*] 
   Adjusted R2 0.05  0.10   0.05  0.10 
   Observations 2,244  2,244   2,244  2,244 
 
Economic complexity High Use at least two types of derivatives instruments or significantly hedge at least two risk exposures [194 New Users]. 
   Low Use only one type of derivatives instrument or hedge only one risk exposure [367 New Users]. 
 
Reporting complexity High Derivatives initiation after SFAS No. 133/138 (June 2000), but before SFAS No. 149 (June 2003) [217 New Users]. 
   Low Derivatives initiation before SFAS No. 133/138 (June 2000) or after SFAS No. 149 (June 2003) [344 New Users]. 
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Panel B: Wald χ2-tests of differences in interaction coefficient differences (NEW_P×POST−NEW_O×POST) across cells in Panel A 
 
Accuracy (AEFA)  Dispersion (AEFD) 
Cella  Cellb  Cella−Cellb χ2-stat Cella  Cellb Cella−Cellb χ2-stat
1 −4.956  4 8.728  −13.684 6.15*** 1 1.047  4 −1.147 2.194 5.28**
1 −4.956  2 −5.938  0.982       0.09  1 1.047  2 1.819         −0.772      0.58 
1 −4.956  3 5.379  −10.335   3.47**  1 1.047  3 −0.662  1.709  4.94** 
2 −5.938  4 8.728  −14.666   4.29**  2 1.819  4 −1.147  2.966      2.68* 
2 −5.938  3 5.379  −11.317  2.22*  2 1.819  3 −0.662  2.481  3.46** 
3 5.379  4 8.728  −3.349       0.37  3 −0.662  4 −1.147  0.485      0.45 
This table reports tests that separate the immediate effects of economic and reporting complexities relating to derivatives initiation on analyst earnings 
forecast properties. Panel A reports the results of estimating the difference-in-differences model (Eq. [2]) using data for the year immediately before (t−1) 
and upon initiation (t) for sample partitions based on whether New Users exhibit high or low types of complexity with respect to derivatives. NEWUSER is 
replaced with NEW_P, which equals 1 for New Users in the partition of interest, and NEW_O, which equals 1 for all other New Users (0 otherwise). POST 
is coded 1 for periods after derivatives initiation for New Users and corresponding control firms (0 otherwise). New Users that upon derivatives initiation 
(a) use at least two types of derivatives instruments (options, futures/forwards, swaps, other) or (b) significantly hedge at least two risk exposures (interest 
rates, foreign exchange rates, or commodity prices) are designated as having high economic complexity; low otherwise. New Users that initiate derivatives 
after the effective date for SFAS Nos. 133 and 138 in June 2000, but before the effective date for SFAS No. 149 in June 2003 are designated as having high 
reporting complexity; low otherwise. The coefficient for NEW_P×POST reflects the effects of derivatives initiation that relate to the partition of interest, 
and the coefficient for NEW_O×POST captures the effects that are not related to the partition of interest, all relative to the control sample. Depending on 
the partition, the difference between the interaction coefficients (NEW_P×POST−NEW_O×POST) is an estimate of the incremental effect of economic 
and/or reporting complexity on analyst earnings forecast properties. Panel B reports Wald χ2-statistics, computed using Seemingly Unrelated Regression, 
for tests of whether interaction coefficient differences are statistically different across cells. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance levels of 0.10, 
0.05, and 0.01, respectively (two-tailed in Panel A; one-tailed in Panel B). Robust standard errors (RSE) are clustered by firm (Petersen 2009). Variables 
are defined in Appendix B.
45 
 
Table 6 
Structural break tests of analyst earnings forecast properties 
 
Panel A: Analyst earnings forecast accuracy (AEFA) 
 (1)  (2) 
 Coeff. RSE Coeff.  RSE
USER −1.589 *** 0.308  −0.853 * 0.440 
SFAS133/138   1.031 ** 0.448 
SFAS149   0.228  0.413 
SFAS155   −1.161 ** 0.580 
SFAS161   −0.668  0.751 
USER×SFAS133/138   −1.665 *** 0.605 
USER×SFAS149   1.353 *** 0.521 
USER×SFAS155   0.503  0.639 
USER×SFAS161   −0.805  0.854 
 ACI Included  Included 
CTRL Included  Included 
Industry Included  Included 
Adjusted R2  0.15 0.15 
Observations 22,792 22,792 
 
Panel B: Analyst earnings forecast dispersion (AEFD) 
 (1)  (2) 
 Coeff. RSE Coeff.  RSE
USER 0.319 *** 0.064  0.151 * 0.091 
SFAS133/138   −0.264 *** 0.097 
SFAS149   0.021  0.080 
SFAS155   0.399 *** 0.131 
SFAS161   0.335 ** 0.152 
USER×SFAS133/138   0.405 *** 0.125 
USER×SFAS149   −0.268 *** 0.100 
USER×SFAS155   −0.245 * 0.139 
USER×SFAS161   0.107  0.170 
ACI Included  Included 
CTRL Included  Included 
Industry Included  Included 
Adjusted R2  0.17 0.18 
Observations 22,792 22,792 
This table reports structural break tests of analyst earnings forecast properties, where USER identifies the User 
(=1) and Non-User (=0) samples. Financial reporting regime indicators are coded 1 for all observations after 
fiscal-years June 2000 (SFAS133/138), June 2003 (SFAS149), September 2006 (SFAS155), and November 2008 
(SFAS161); 0 otherwise (see Appendix A for a summary). Interaction coefficients (i.e., shifts in slope) indicate 
if a structural break (i.e., change in model parameters) in the dependent variable occurs among derivatives users 
in a given reporting regime. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance levels of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, 
respectively (two-tailed). Reported t-statistics are based on robust standard errors (RSE) clustered by firm 
(Petersen 2009). Variables are defined in Appendix B. 
 
 
